To understand Kant's transcendental deduction of categories we must distinguish between Kant's strategy foe constructing such a deduction and the manner in which this strategy is executed. I argue that both versions of the deduction contain similar strategies in which categories are identified with transcendental conditions of experience. Where the versions differ substantially is in the manner Kant executes the various stages of this strategy. It is pointed out, for instance, that in the ob jective deduction in A Kant introduces 'understanding' as a defined term (A119), whereas in B Kant postulates understanding as the funda mental activity of synthesis in terms of which he formulates the argu ments of each stage of the deduction. Once the distinction between strategy and execution is accepted, much of Vaihinger's evidence for the "patchwork thesis" dissolves. But I also argue that in neither ver sion of the deduction does Kant execute the identificatory strategy with convincing success.
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In the Aesthetic Kant argues, "Space is nothing but the form of all appearances of outer sense. It is the subjective condition of sensibility under which alone outer intuition is possible for us" (A26/B42). In German this is one sentence connected by das ist. Why should showing space to be the form of appearances show that it is a subjective condi tion of sensibility? The initial framework for an answer to this ques tion is given in the introductory paragraphs of the Aesthetic ( § 1 in B), where Kant argues that the form of appearances "must lie ready for sensations a priori in the mind" (A20/B34). In this way Kant attempts to introduce the form of appearances as the subjective condition of sen sibility. The problem he then sets for himself in the body of the Aes thetic is to discover what these forms actually are, in particular, to identify space and time with them: "In the course of this investigation it will be found that there are two pure forms of [appearances^..., namely space and time" (A22/B36).
The argument of the Aesthetic, then,is iüfentificatory: having intro duced an appropriate notion of the form of appearance, Kant proceeds to identify space and time with this form. In the transcendental deduc tion Kant argues that experience of appearances would be impossible unless the transcendental synthesis to which this experience is subject is catégorial. Similarly, this argument is identificatory: it proceeds by identifying categories with transcendental conditions of experience. But executing this argument in the deduction of categories turns out to be a more complicated affair than the relatively simple argument of the Aesthetic. Kant's strategy must involve the following stages: Comments. Stage (2), as I have said, corresponds to the initial phase of the Aesthetic argument; but Kant encounters special difficul ties in the case of the deduction. Kant, in the first piace, must avoid begging any questions against a Humean analysis of experience which admits no transcendental conditions of experience but considers all conditions of experience to be merely psychological, and therefore e m pirical. Secondly, by having already introduced the term 'appearance1, Kant was able in the Aesthetic to introduce 'form of appearance' as a corollary to that notion. But no similar procedure is available for in troducing transcendental conditions of experience. Since the notion of an object of experience can be justified only through the construction of a deduction of categories, the form of this object cannot be admitted as an element in the proof simply as a corollary of that notion. The intro duction of 'appearance' is legitimate because it is tied to the concept of intuition (A20/B34), but the anti-sceptical claim that an object of knowl edge is tied to our experience of appearances raises a philosophical quandry. Therefore, the form of an object of experience must be as certained, if it can be ascertained at all, only through an analysis of the conditions of experience. This comment leads to an observation on the nature of a transcendental analysis of experience: In A, Kant seems unsure of how to proceed with this analysis, and in B, where the argument is worked out more successfully, he claims that its (sole) premise is a tautology. Thus Kant's conception of such an analysis did not follow one, direct line from the first, and, contrary to some con temporary views on transcendental arguments (see fn. 4 above), Kant, in the end, probably would not have wanted to propose an argument whose premises fall under semantic categories beyond those of stand ard logic.
Finally, regarding Stage (3), it must be noted that the identification of categories with conditions of experience is not as straightforward as the identification of space and time with the form of appearances. The latter simply are the forms of appearances. However, the conditions of experience, in falling under the transcendental unity of apperception, are modes of synthesis, or schematic unities, within experience, whereas categories are concepts. To speak precisely, Kant identifies categories with concepts that are necessary components of these modes. Nonetheless, bridging the gap between categories and conditions of ex perience results in a nettlesome problem of accounting for the content of categories --roughly, the level of synthesis that is thought by means of them--in a manner that would facilitate this identification. In A Kant p la c e s th is m e ta -c la im at the end of the deduction chapter; he e n title s its fin a l paragraph , "Sum m ary R ep resen ta tion of the C o r r e c t n e ss of th is D ed u c tio n .. . and of its being the only D eduction p o ss ib le " (A 128, em p h a sis added). In B , h ow ever, Kant ex ecu tes S tages (1) and (3) in such a w ay that the r e str ic tio n of c a teg o rie s to o b jects of e x p e r i en ce can be obtained as a c o r o lla r y of the in itia l sta g e s of the deduction (se e b elow , P a rt V . B).
S tages (1) through (3), h ow ever, do not exhaust the stra teg y of the deduction, fo r th ey can show only that if c a te g o r ie s a r e con ditions of p o ssib le e x p e rie n c e , thoeyrare o b je c tiv ely v a lid . T h is le a v e s open the p o ss ib ility that the c a te g o r ie s m ay be v alid in
The p rin cip a l sectionscsif the A n alytic of C oncepts in A n ea tly fa ll into th e se in itia l th ree sta g e s. Thus se c tio n 3 of the chapter on the "clue" to d isc o v e r in g c a te g o r ie s, the so -c a lle d m eta p h y sica l deduction, fu l f ills Stage (1). C orresp on d in gly, se c tio n 2 of the deduction chapter it s e lf, w hich con tain s the th eory of the th r e e -fo ld sy n th e sis, fu lfills Stage (2), and the deduction p ro p er tak es p la ce w here Kant in d ic a te s, in se c tio n 3 of th at ch a p ter. Kant ack n ow led ges the id en tifica to ry n a tu re of h is argu m en t w here we w ould exp ect him : in su b sectio n 4 of se c tio n 2, the* " P relim in a ry E xplanation of the P o s s ib ility of the C ate-9 lt is in te r e stin g to note that the A esth e tic argu m en t, lik e w ise , has b een c r itic iz e d fo r fa ilin g to show that sp ace and tim e a re not a lso p ro p e r tie s of th in gs in th e m se lv e s . F o r d isc u ssio n s of th is c r itic is m , se e K em p Sm ith, C om m entary, pp. 1 1 3 -1 1 4 , and H enry E . A lliso n , The K ant-E berhard C on trov ersy (B a ltim o re: Johnsîffippkins U n iv e r sity P r e s s , 1973), pp. 3 4 -3 6 . A lliso n defends the A esth e tic argu m en t in "The N o n -sp a tia lity of T hings in T h e m se lv e s fo r K ant," Journal of the H is to ry of P h ilosop h y (V ol. XIY , 1976). H ow ever, it should be cte a r that in the c a se of the tran scen d en ta l deduction of c a te g o r ie s, Kant could not a v a il h im se lf o f the sa m e kind of argu m en t that A lliso n d ev elo p s in d e fending the A e sth e tic 's r e str ic tio n of sp ace and tim e to a p p ea ra n ces. g o r ie s .. . ", w hich fu n ction s a s a tra n sitio n b etw een S tages (2) and (3). Kant w r ite s, The a p rio ri con ditions of a p o ssib le e x p erien ce in g en era l a re at the sam e tim e con ditions of the p o ssib ility of o b jects of e x p e r ie n c e . Nhw I m ain tain that the c a te g o r ie s. . .a r e nothing but the con ditions of thought in a p o ssib le ex p e rie n c e . . . . T his is ex a ctly what we d e sir e d to p rove (A 111).
The HfMBt sen ten ce d oes not in d icate a com p leted argum ent; rather it in d ic a te s a ta sk to be com p leted . In P a rts Ht & IV, I sh a ll exam in e K ant's execu tion of S ta g es (1) through (3) in A . In P a rt V, I sh a ll a r gue that in B K ant reta in s the sam e id en tifica to ry stra te g y but ra d i c a lly a lte r s the execu tion of each of th ese sta g e s. H ow ever, I sh all argue a lso that the deduction s till d oes not con stitu te a su c c e ssfu l a r gum ent. . N e v e r th e le ss, a c le a r con cep tion of the d iffe r ent con n ection s b etw een sy n th esis and im agination and sy n th e sis and understanding d oes e m erg e (A 78 /B 10 3). "Synthesis in g e n e r a l," Kant te lls u s, "is a m e r e r e su lt of the pow er of im agin ation , a blind but indispensâÜaQte fu nction of the so u l. " U nderstanding, on the other hand, i»; said "to b ring th is sy n th esis to co n c ep ts. " V aihinger and o th ers have charged K ant's notion o f sy n th esis in A w ith am bigu ity in being so m e tim e s treated as a function of im agin ation and then again as a function of und erstan ding. ^® In fa ct, K ant's p ositio n in A is u nam biguously that 10In G ram , pp. 3 3 -3 4 . The p a ssa g e s in w hich Kant a lle g e d ly a ssig n s sy n th esis to u nderstanding a re A 77 and A 9 7 -9 8 . The sim p le st re sp o n se is to deny the cla im m ade by K ant's c r itic s . In A l l Kant sa y s m e r e ly that "the sp on taneity of our thought req u ires that [the m anifold of pure intu ition be sy n th e size d } . " T his is com p atib le w ith the th e sis that a sy n th e sis is a fu nction of im agin ation . U nderstanding su p p lies con cep ts by w hich we co n ceiv e in a u nified c o n sc io u sn e ss the p a rticu la r kind of sy n th e sis that has been effected by im agin ation . L et us co n sid er an ex a m p le. Im agin ation is the fa cu lty of crea tin g an im age of an o b ject that is not p re se n t (B 151). S yn th esis a r is e s w hen the com ponents of such an im age a re crea ted by im agin ation in co n n ec tion with one a n oth er. In p erceiv in g a h ou se we m ay se e only the fron t, y et w e m u st im agin e sid e s and a back in o rd er to apply the con cep t of h ou se to what we p e r c e iv e . T his con cep t sp e c ifie s the sy n th e sis as a p a rticu la r kind and so a s b elonging to a p articu la r kind of ob ject.
HI. S tages (1) and (2) in
But the sy n th e sis in volved in the reco g n ition of a h ou se is m e r e ly e m p ir ic a l. In the A esth e tic Kant had introdu ced a m anifold of pure in tu ition a s part of hum an cognition; thus th ere m u st be a lso a p u re, o r tra n scen d en ta l, sy n th e sis of th is m an ifold . Kant sa y s , " T ran scen d en tal lo g ic . . .h a s lyin g b efore it a m anifold of a p rio ri se n sib ility , p r e sen ted by tra n scen d en ta l a e sth e tic , as m a te r ia l fo r th e con cep ts ofipure understanding" (A 76-??/B 102). The con cep ts "which give unity to th is pure sy n th e sis, and w hich c o n sist so le ly in the rep resen ta tio n of th is n e c e s s a r y sy n th etic unity" a re c a te g o r ie s (A 7 9 /B 1 0 4 ). T h ese co n cep ts, then, sp ec ify the sy n th e sis of the pure m anifold as a p a rticu lar kind. C on sequ en tly, we m ay define a categ o ry as a con cep t that r e p r e se n ts a kind of syn th etic unity to be found in the sy n th e sis of the m anifold of pure intuition. T his d efin ition m ay appear to b eg the quetetion by d efin ing 'category* in te r m s of the syn th etic conditions of ex p e rie n c e . H ow e v e r , th is is not the c a se , for Kant has s till to show that the sy n th etic u n ities r e p resen ted by c a te g o r ie s a re indeed conditions of any p o ssib le ex p erien ce and that th ey a re req u ired fo r a tra n scen d en ta l unity of ap p ercep tio n w ith whibaie stru ctu re the c a te g o r ie s a re id en tified . Elatai*-lish in g th e se th e s e s is a m a tter fo r the deduction p roper: se e e s p e c ia lly the o b jectiv e deduction of A (below , P a rt IV ).
A ccord in g to th is d efin ition , c a te g o r ie s p o s s e s s a con tent through sy n th e sis effected by im agin ation is a n e c e s s a r y condition of the sp on ta n eity of u nd erstan ding, w hich only then a p p lies a concept to that sy n th e s is . C oncepts req u ire so m eth in g to w hich th ey apply. In A97 Kant c la im s that sp on tan eity "is the ground of a th reefo ld sy n th e sis. " T his statem en t m ay m ean nothing m o re than that sy n th esis is a "blind" fu n c tion that m u st be "guided" throughout by a spontaneous u n d erstan ding. But the v a g u en ess of th is p a ssa g e lie s not on ly with the w ord 'ground'; in III. B we sh a ll se e that the notion of the " threefold sy n th esis" its e lf is highly su sp e c t. w hich th ey r e p r e se n t the u nity of a p a rticu la r kind of pure sy n th e sis. Kant m ain tain s th is d efin ition c o n siste n tly throughout the deduction in A . A t A 119, in re h e a r sin g the d efin ition of 'ca teg ory ' in te r m s of the co n clu sio n of th e o b jectiv e deduction, Kant sa y s that c a te g o r ie s " con tain the n e c e s s a r y unity of the pure sy n th e sis of the im agin ation in r e sp ect of a ll p o ssib le a p p ea ra n ces," and at A 125 he im p lie s that the fo r m a l unity in the tra n scen d en ta l sy n th e sis of im agin ation is con That Kant em p loy s the p sy ch o lo g y of N . T eten s' P h ilo so phi sch e V e rsuche übcr M en sch lich e N atur und ih re E ntw icklung (1776-77) is now w ell known. T eten s analyzed cogn ition into th ree e m p ir ic a l p r o c e s s e s : ap p reh en sion in in tu ition , reprod uction in im agin ation , and reco g n ition is a con cep t. In a con fu sing m ove K ant a ssig n s the title " sy n th esis" to each of th e s« , (A97) --con fu sing b eca u se th is p sy ch o lo g ica l se n se of sy n th e sis is u n related to the se n se of sy n th e sis that is tied to im agin ation and w as d efined in Stage (1). The fo r m er is m e r e ly the unity of a p sy ch o lo g ica l a ctiv ity , and th ere is no com p ellin g rea so n to a ssig n th is a ctiv ity e x c lu siv e ly to im agin ation . The p sy ch o lo g ica l se n se of 'sy n th e sis ' d isc u sse d in th is sectio n of the deduction r e p r e sen ts an e x tr a neous qse,©f the con cep t that w as not even retain ed in the deduction p r o - T his d isc u ssio n of 'o b ject of rep resen ta tio n ' is im portan t in the c r it ic a l p h ilosop h y, but Kant w as app arently at a lo s s to know w here and how to in co rp ora te it into A . Its lo g ic a l in a p p rop ria ten ess at th is point is a tte sted to by the breakdow n b etw e e n it and the p roced u re of the p r e ceding two a rg u m en ts. N ot only d oes the c r itic a l p h ilosop h y lack a m ean s of introducing tra n scen d en ta l reco g n ition at th is point even if so m e c a teg o ria lly independent se n se could be m ad e of th is notion, but e m p ir ic a l a p p ercep tion its e lf is not a m a n ife st p sy ch o lo g ica l com p o nent of con cep tu al reco g n itio n . K ant, th e re fo r e , m u st introdu ce both the e m p ir ic a l notion of ap p ercep tion as a com ponent of the p sy ch o lo g ica l p r o c e s s a s w ell as its tra n scen d en ta l cou n terp art (se e A 1 0 6 -7 ). But the argu m en t through A 107 d oes not even m ake the p reten se of show ing that e m p ir ic a l ap p ercep tion is a com ponent of con cep tu al reco g n ition , though Kant la te r se e m s to think that he has show n th is (in A 115). 
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once: on the one hand, to introduce tra n scen d en ta l unity of a p p ercep tion a s a n e c e s s a r y condition of e x p erien ce (A 104 through A 107), and, on the oth er, to a n sw er the in itia l q u estion regard in g the m ean in g of 'ob ject o f rep resen ta tio n ' (A 104 through A 110). The la tte r , w hich is w h olly su p ersed ed in B , w ill not con cern us h er e . To show that the c o n sc io u sn e ss of an o b ject by m ean s of con cep ts p resu p p o ses ( i.e . im p lie s) a tra n scen d en ta l unity of s e lf-c o n s c io u s n e s s , Kant c la im s that in so fa r a s rep resen ta tio n s r e la te to an ob ject, th ey m u st con stitu te a u n ity that is m ade n e c e s s a r y through the con cep t of that o b ject. The argu m en t then p ro ceed s: S in ce th is o b ject is "nothing to u s, " the unity that the con cep t m a k es n e c e s s a r y can be nothing e ls e than the fo rm a l unity of c o n sc io u sn e ss in a sy n th esis of the given m anifold of intuition (A 105). T his fo rm a l unity off c o n sc io u sn e ss, Kant a rg u es, m u st be a tra n scen d en ta l unity of ap p ercep tion b eca u se (i) "A ll n e c e s s ity . . . i s grounded in a tra n scen d en ta l condition" (A 106, but unsupported), and (ii) I m u st be c o n scio u s of th is ground as depending upon m y a p p ercep tion (u n sta ted !). We cannot evalu ate K ant's h igh ly c o m p r essed and convulted argu m en t h er e (it is rep la ced by a m o re elegan t argum ent in B); rather,! I want to exam in e se v e r a l c o r o lla r ie s that a re relev a n t to our reco n stru ctio n of both v e r sio n s of the deduction. And, ind eed , th is happens at A 119 and at A 1 2 4 -1 2 5 . I w ish to su g g e st that the o b jectiv e sid e of the deduction runs fro m A 116 through A 1 1 9 ,^ w h ile the m uch lon ger argu m en t fro m A 119 through A 125, beginning w ith "We w ill now , sta rtin g fro m b e lo w ,. , ", co n stitu tes its su b jectiv e sid e . Kant co n sid e r s th e se argu m en ts to be "two sid es" of one a rg u m en t probably b eca u se he thinks of m en tal a ctiv ity as being d escrib a b le eith er in its rela tio n to its ob ject or in its rela tio n to the subject; thus he attem pts to p rove the id en tity of c a te g o r ie s w ith tra n scen d en ta l co n d ition s v is -a -v is both w ays of d escrib in g c o n sc io u sn e ss. N e v e r th e le s s, the argu m en ts a re linked in that the su b jectiv e deduction m u st a ssu m e that a p p ea ran ces can be o b jects of know ledge (A 120), w h ereas th is th e s is is p roven in the o b jectiv e deduction (A 119). W hile the tex t of the deduction in A , then, p r e se n ts a continuous d isc u ssio n , the ob jectiv e deduction rem a in s " essen tia l" fo r K ant's p u rp o ses (A xvii).
C ontra in terp reta tio n s such a s W o lff's, th ere is no one p r e m ise that is the p r e m ise of the deduction in A; nor d oes Kant adopt one p a r ticu la r p ro ced u re fo r execu tin g Stage (3). The p r e m ise of the o b jectiv e deduction is that know ledge iâaepKBSAEiblë-onfrsHf in tu ition s a re taken up into one c o n sc io u sn e ss that is aw are of its id en tity in a ll of its r e p r e se n ta tio n s (A 116). Though Kant d oes not d isc u ss the statu s of th is im p o r tant p r e m ise , he tr e a ts a sim ila r p ro p o sition a s a tautology in B . But in B , as we sh a ll s e e , Kant em p loys th is p ro p o sition to a m uch d iffe r ent end, n am ely, for the execu tion of Stage (2)
. In A , th is p rop osition can function as a p r e m ise of the deduction p r e c is e ly b eca u se tr a n sc e n dental ap p ercep tion w as introduced in Stage (2) as a condition for the u se of e m p ir ic a l con cep ts in e x p e rie n c e . Thus the o b jectiv e deduction p ro ceed s by ca refu l d efin ition of the con ditions that m ake p o ssib le the sy n th e sis in im agin ation that is req u ired to bring the m anifold of in tu i tion into a syn th etic unity under the tra n scen d en ta l unity of a p p ercep tion . On the oth er hand, the su b jectiv e deduction b egin s with the p r e m is e that m an has p er c e p tio n s, c o n sc io u sn e ss of a p p ea ra n ces, w hich is a g en era l fa c t about hum an n atu re, and p ro ceed s by r e g r e s s iv e ly a scerta in in g the m en tal fa c u ltie s and con ditions of th eir em ploym ent that a r e n e c e s s a r y fo r obtaining a unified e x p e rie n c e , or know ledge of an o b ject, on the b a sis of p ercep tio n . R-9 S in ce th ese argu m en ts are su p ersed ed in B by a m o re lo g ic a lly e le gant execu tio n of Stage (3), we sh a ll not co n sid er them in d eta il h e r e . N o n e th e le ss, the fo llow in g point is n otew orthy regard in g the o b jectiv e d eduction. Kant in tro d u ces the sy n th e sis of pure im agin ation as that w hich e ffe c ts the fo r m a l unity in the m an ifold of intu ition . C a teg o ries a re then id en tified w ith tra n scen d en ta l con d ition s of ex p erien ce through the n e c e s s a r y rela tion sh ip of th is sy n th e sis to tra n scen d en ta l a p p ercep tion . T his rela tio n sh ip , Kant a s s e r ts , co n stitu tes understanding: "T he u n ity of ap p ercep tion in rela tio n to the sy n th e sis of im agin ation is the undBEift&nding11 (A 119). T his is so b eca u se the c a te g o r ie s, as a p rio ri con cep ts of u nderstanding, a re con cep ts of the unity of the pure sy n th e sis of im agin ation (se e Stage (1)). T hus, the need to p ostu late a r e lation sh ip b etw een the pure sy n th esis of im agin ation and tra n scen d en ta l ap p ercep tion ju st is the need to p ostu late v ariou s m ean s of con cep tu al izin g that sy n th e sis. The id en tifica tion of c a teg o rie s w ith the n e c e s s a r y con cep ts of the con ditions of ex p e rie n c e is a ch iev ed in § 20. S in ce judging is an a c tiv ity of understanding by m ean s of w hich the o b jectiv e unity of a m a n i fold is a rticu la ted (8 19), and sin c e c a te g o r ie s "are ju st [the lo g ic a l J fu n ction s of judgm ent, in so fa r a s th ey a re em ployed in d eterm in ation of the m anifold of given intuition" (B 143), judging m u st u tiliz e c a teg 6 -r ie s in a rticu la tin g the unity of a m an ifold . "C onsequently, the m a n i fo ld in a given in tu ition is n e c e s s a r ily su bject to the c a teg o rie s" (B 143). In § 26 Kant a rg u es that the sy n th e sis w hich a p p lies to our ap p reh en sion of o b jects can be "no other than" that of the c a te g o r ie s. T his ss so b e ca u se (i) p ercep tio n m u st be su b ject to an a p rio ri sy n th esis of sp ace and of tim e, (ii) sin c e sp ace and tim e can be rep resen ted a p r io r i, the unity of th eir sy n th e sis m u st be given a p r io r i, and (iii) only the sy n th e sis contained in the c a te g o r ie s " is given a p rio ri a s the condition of the sy n th esis of a ll apprehension" (B l6 l)"
C a te g o r ie s, th e r e fo r e , a re o b je c tiv ely valid in v irtu e of the fa c t that u nderstanding is what is gen erated in the r e la tion sh ip b etw een the pure sy n th esis of im agin ation and tra n scen d en ta l ap p ercep tion (w hose o b jectiv e v a lid ity we have a lrea d y show n). T hus, the v a lid ity of c a te g o r ie s is show n in A by show ing the n e c e s s ity of in troducing 'understanding' --a n d w ith it, its pure c o n c e p t s --a s a d e fin ed term in the deduction.

That 'understanding' is a d eriv a tiv e con cep t in the o b jectiv e d ed uc tion exp lain s why
judgm ents of p ercep tio n and o b jectiv e judgm ents of e x p e rie n c e . And th ird ly , both h is (perhaps m isgu id ed ) d e sir e to cou nter the c r itic is m that he had ob liter a te d a ll tra n scen d en t e x is t e n c e^ a s w ell a s h is own in v estig a tio n s into the m e ta p h y sic a l p resu p p o sitio n s of m o ra ls w ere fo rcin g Kant
In th is v e r sio n of the d e duction, the r e str ic tio n of c a te g o r ie s to ap p earan ces (8 22) fo llo w s a s a c o r o lla r y to th eir introduction into the deduction v ia th eir con n ection w ith judgm ent. S in ce judgm ent is r e str ic te d to given ob jects and is , th e re fo r e , su b ject to the con ditions of intuition, c a te g o r ie s, as fu n c- T his in terp reta tio n is e n tir e ly a ccu ra te, but it m is s e s the point. W ith out som e idea of the underlying m ech a n ism s that con nect in te lle c t and im agination , we have we way of a scerta in in g a p rio ri what actual sy n th e sis in e x p erien ce con form s with an in tellectu a l sy n th esis in a c a te gory. What H enrich ig n o res and Kant apparently forgot is that 
